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High Court Gives the World a
First-Should the United States Follow
Suit?
I. Introduction
On August 14, 1997, the High Court of Australia handed down
a decision that is unique among copyright cases throughout the
world. In Telstra Corp. v. Australasian Performing Right Associa-
tion, Telstra, a telecommunications service provider, was sued by
the Australasian Performing Right Association (hereinafter
"APRA") for infringing musical copyrights owned by APRA and
its clients.' The High Court held that Telstra was liable for
copyright infringement when Telstra allowed its business customers
to place their callers on hold to the sounds of unlicensed music.2
This was the first time that the highest court of a nation has held
a service provider liable for copyright infringement simply because
the offending material was disseminated over its network.3
Until recently, Telstra was the only provider of telephone
services in Australia, and it remains the largest such company.4
Telstra, formerly known as Telecom, has an exclusive license to
build and maintain the telecommunications network for Australia.'
1. Telstra Corporation Limited v. Australasian Performing Right Association
Limited, 146 A.L.R. 649 (1997). Note: Page numbers for the Telstra cases were
not available in LEXIS. Author's pagination for the High Court case, 146 A.L.R.
649 (1997), begins with page 1; author's pagination for the full court (appellate-
level) case, 131 A.L.R. 141 (1995), begins with page 205. Page number references
to the 1993 federal court case are those indicated in the printout of the case itself,
beginning with page number 368.
2. Id. at 75.
3. Christie Eliezer, Australian Music Fee Ruling Has Global Scope,
BILLBOARD, September 6, 1997, at 10.
4. Telstra's Annual Net Profit Has Slumped. AAP NEWSFEED, August 29,
1997, available in LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS File. Telstra's annual profit
for the year which ended June 30, 1997, was down 30% to $1.9 billion (Aus)
compared to $2.3 billion earned in the previous year. Id.
5. In both the appellate case and the trial level case, the courts referred to
Telstra by its former name, Telecom. Australasian Performing Right Association
Ltd. v. Telstra Corporation Ltd. 131 A.L.R. 141, 208 (1995); Australasian
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Telstra is owned by the government, but at the time of the High
Court decision it was in the process of being partially privatized in
a public stock offering of one-third of the company.6 The compa-
ny remains the dominant player in telecommunications in Australia,
providing most of the infrastructure and much of the service for
telephone, mobile communications, cable, broadband service and
related services.
7
The Australasian Performing Right Association is the primary
performing rights society in Australia, collecting royalties and
licensing fees on behalf of its 20,000 members who have assigned
it various distribution and performance rights in their musical
works. 8 APRA does not merely represent Australian musicians,
but upholds the interests of composers and performer worldwide.
In fact, the infringement in this case includes songs that are
obviously not Australian in origin, such as "Let It Be," by the
Beatles.9 APRA has been aggressive in enforcing the rights of its
members, and enjoys a reputation for being somewhat litigious.1"
APRA's functional equivalents in the United States are the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP")
and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI").
As a result of the High Court decision, in March of 1998,
Telstra reached an agreement with APRA for the unpaid royalty
payments due to APRA's songwriters, composers and copyright
owners.11 The figure originally discussed, according to APRA
CEO Brett Cottle, was estimated to be a "few million dollars,"
although the final sum was undisclosed.12 In a related suit, APRA
took action against online service provider OzEmail for infringe-
ment of copyrighted music transmitted by OzEmail over the
Performing Right Association Ltd. v. Telstra Corporation Ltd. 118 A.L.R. 684, 370
(1993). The telecommunications license is cited in APRA v. Telstra 131 A.L.R.
at 205.
6. Telstra's Annual Net Profit Has Slumped, supra note 4.
7. APRA v. Telstra 146 A.L.R. at 40. See also Telstra leads the interactive
race, Telstra Corp. Press release (April 26, 1996) <http://www.telstra.com.au-
/search/index. html>.
8. Eliezer, supra note 3, at 10.
9. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 370.
10. Patricia Loughlan, Music on Hold: The Case of Copyright and the
Telephone, Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Australasian Performing Right Association
Ltd., 18 SYDNEY L. REV. 342, 342 (1996).
11. Telstra Reaches Agreement on Payment for Hold Music, AAP NEWSFEED,
March 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS file.
12. Eliezer, supra note 3, at 10; see also Telstra Reaches Agreement, supra note
11 (stating, "Commercial-in-confidence arrangements preclude the disclosure of the
amount").
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Internet.13 While APRA and OzEmail recently settled out of
court for an undisclosed sum, APRA is also negotiating with other
Internet service providers, particularly music-based sites, for
licenses and royalties.14
This comment will focus on the implications of the Telstra
decision for Australian copyright law, and on the relationship of
this decision to the debate now under way in the United States
over the issue of service provider liability for copyright infringe-
ment. Section II will provide general background on the status of
copyright law in Australia prior to this decision and the cases which
led to the current state of the law. Section III will analyze the legal
trends in Australia, focusing on the Telstra case and its rationale,
and will point to issues not resolved by the Telstra case that may
have an impact on future decisions in Australia and elsewhere.
Section IV will look at the background caselaw and trends in the
United States, concentrating on the congressional debate over the
issues of service provider liability and implementation of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (hereinafter "WIPO") treaties.
Finally, section V will conclude with an analysis of the pros and
cons of the two trends, and will discuss the Telstra decision and
U.S. decisions as they relate to Australian and United States
legislative solutions to the issue of service provider liability.
II. Background
A. Copyright Protection-Origins
Prior to the invention of the printing press, Western society
had little need to protect the fruits of authorship from unauthorized
reproduction. Monks laboriously hand-copied books (primarily
Bibles), a method which precluded literary piracy on any meaning-
ful level, as it might take a year or more to copy a text or treatise
by hand. 5 But, with the advent of Gutenberg's printing press
over 500 years ago, it became economically possible to produce
multiple copies of works, a situation which both dramatically
13. APRA, OzEmail Settle Court Case, AAP NEWSFEED, June 9, 1998,
available in LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS file.
14. Id. OzEmail did not admit liability in the settlement, and APRA pledged
to refrain from further proceedings against OzEmail or other service providers that
joined in the settlement. Id.
15. Sherri L. Burr, The Piracy Gap: Protecting Intellectual Property in an Era
of Artistic Creativity and Technological Change, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 245-46
(1997).
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increased the availability of knowledge and enabled authors to
make a living from the sale of their creations.
16
Even after the introduction of the printing press to England in
1476, English authors still had to wait over 200 years to control the
dissemination of their works.17  Instead of authors being in
control, the Stationers' Company, by virtue of a 160-year monopoly
granted by the Crown, maintained control over all printed works,
ensuring that no politically seditious nor religiously heretical works
would leave the press.Is When the monopoly ended in 1694, the
Stationers' Company petitioned Parliament for property rights to
be granted to the authors, believing that they could continue to
maintain their control over published works in this fashion. 19 In
1709, Parliament granted those rights to authors in the world's first
copyright act-the Statute of Anne.E° Significantly, the Statute of
Anne was intended to encourage learning by granting to authors
the exclusive right to copy their work. 1 Eighty years later it
served as a model for copyright protection in the fledgling United
States of America. 2
Modern copyright law has expanded to protect a much wider
range of intellectual property than books alone. Under the laws of
the United States, protection is afforded to the creators of literary,
musical, and dramatic works, ,pantomimes and choreography,
graphic works, motion pictures and audiovisual works, sound
recordings, and architectural works.23 Australian copyright law
protects similar categories, grouped under the headings of original
works (including literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works), and
the subject matter headings of sound recordings, cinematograph
films, television and sound broadcasts, and published editions.
24
16. Id. at 246.
17. Brian A. Carlson, Comment, Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright
Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 825, 828 (1997).
18. Id. at 828.
19. Id.
20. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1709); Burr, supra note 15, at 246 n.6.
21. Burr, supra note 15, at 246-47.
22. Id. at 247.
23. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1101 (West, 1996). Specifically, section 102 of the
Copyright Act lists the subject matter that is afforded protection.
24. Copyright Act 1968, §§ 32, 85-88.
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B. Service Provider Liability in Australia Prior to the Telstra
Decision
Prior to the Telstra decision, Australian rulings on the question
of service provider liability were sparse and case specific. The
Telstra decision, unlike its predecessors, focused primarily on
interpreting the Copyright Act 1968.25 Those portions of the
Copyright Act 1968 (hereinafter "the Act") that are pertinent to
this inquiry include protection of a copyright owner's exclusive
right to broadcast literary, musical, and dramatic works through
traditional wireless means ("broadcast right"),2 6 and the right to
cause the work to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion
service using cable technology ("diffusion right").27 The Act itself
is modeled on the Copyright Act 1956 of the United Kingdom, and
the Australian legislators apparently followed the direction of the
UK version, particularly when drafting the language pertaining to
a diffusion right.2 s
Until the Telstra case, Australian copyright cases dealing with
broadcast or diffusion rights centered on questions such as whether
a public performance took place when music in an instructional
video was played for a group of bank employees. Other cases
which focused on service providers did not address the issue raised
by Telstra. For example, in one decision that, like Telstra, involved
both wireless and cable broadcasting of copyrighted material, the
court held that the rebroadcast of free-to-air programs by a cable
television provider was not an infringement of the free-to-air
broadcaster's copyright.3" In a second case, the court held that a
university library authorized a third party's copyright infringement
25. The normal usage in Australia is to refer to statutes as "the Copyright Act
1968," not as "the Copyright Act of 1968."
26. Copyright Act 1968, § 31(1)(a)(iv).
27. Loughlan, supra note 10, at 345-46; see also Copyright Act 1968, §§ 26,
31(1)(a)(v). For example, a cable television company is a diffusion service.
28. Loughlin, supra note 10, at 346; see also Copyright Act 1968 § 31(1)(a)(v).
29. Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. v. Commonwealth Bank
of Australia 111 A.L.R. 671 (1992).
30. Amalgamated Television Services v. Foxtel Digital Cable Television 32
I.P.R. 323, 338 (1995) (author's pagination, see also note 1). Free-to-air broadcasts
are simply those that are transmitted to anyone with a receiving apparatus, such
as those transmitted by radio stations and network television. Id. In Amalgamat-
ed Television, the court held that the rebroadcast of free-to-air programming to
subscribers who were unable to receive commercial channels or who received them
poorly was merely an additional service to such subscribers. Id.
1998]
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when it provided self-service photocopy machines without monitor-
ing the use of the machines for potential infringement.31
Thus, the question of service provider liability is a new one in
Australia. Of necessity, courts turn to decades-old copyright
statutes and sparse case law to find the answers to modern
problems created by communications technology, including music
on hold. Other telecommunications applications might potentially
be implicated, including faxes, answering machines, personal
computers, teleconferencing, and the Internet. Twenty-five years
ago, none of this technology was available.32 Now we find the
High Court of Australia holding a telephone company liable for
copyright infringement that occurs over its network of wires, cables,
and wireless transmission facilities.3 3 In the Northern Hemisphere
we find the United States Congress deep in debate over whether
Prodigy or Netcom should be held liable for the infringement of
copyright taking place on their Internet subscribers' bulletin
boards. 4 The two notions, both driven by technology, and both
hampered by out-of-date statutes, are closely related.
1. The 1993 Trial Decision-APRA v. Telstra.-The Telstra
decision was a test case where the parties collaborated in bringing
the litigation so as to bring about a legal ruling where none had
previously existed.35 Factual situations were purposely designed
to test the consequences of each scenario under the copyright
law.36 These situations centered around the fact that Telstra
Corporation, without paying a license fee or obtaining permission,
provided music to telephone callers who were placed on hold.
Three distinct scenarios were employed as tests: 1) music on
hold was played by a business directly to its caller, using Telstra's
general transmission system; 2) music was played by Telstra directly
to a person calling one of Telstra's service centers; and, 3) music
was played by Telstra to persons who called one of Telstra's
CustomNet (music on hold service) subscribers. 37 Each of the
three scenarios could occur in two ways: either by a caller utilizing
31. University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse 6 A.L.R. 193, 206 (1975)
(author's pagination, see also note 1).
32. BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 44-45 (rev.ed. 1996).
33. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 2.
34. Bob Dart, High- Tech World Split on Internet Copyright Issue, Cox NEWS
SERVICE, September 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
35. Loughlan, supra note 10, at 342.
36. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R at 370.
37. Id.
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a regular telephone, or by a caller using a wireless mobile tele-
phone.38 In each instance, a device such as a radio, CD player, or
tape player provided the actual music, and in each instance the
music played over Telstra's system was protected by a copyright
owned by APRA.39
APRA sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, and in
particular sought to restrain [Telstra] from performing or
authorizing the performance of the subject works in public,
broadcasting them, transmitting them to any subscriber to a
telecommunications service provided by [Telstra], and from
authorizing or permitting any person to connect to the telecom-
munications network any equipment capable of transmitting the
works to subscribers of [Telstra] °
The rights which APRA claimed were breached by Telstra are
enumerated in section 31(1) of the Copyright Act 1968, which
provides, in part: "copyright..'. is the exclusive right: (a) in the
case of a literary, dramatic, or musical work, to do all or any of the
following acts: ... (iii) to perform a work in public; (iv) to
broadcast the work; (v) to cause the work to be transmitted to
subscribers to a diffusion service . . ... 4 APRA contended that
Telstra violated APRA's exclusive rights described in subpara-
graphs (iii) and (v) when it transmitted music played either by third
parties or by itself, and violated APRA's right described in
subparagraph (iv) when it transmitted music on hold to mobile
telephones. 4
2
At the trial level, the Federal Court, General Division,
Gummow, J., decided that Telstra could not be held liable for
copyright infringement when callers were placed on hold using
unlicensed music.43 In coming to his decision that Telstra was not
liable for infringement, Judge Gummow painstakingly analyzed not
only the pertinent sections of the Copyright Act 1968, but the
electronic technology used in making telephone calls.' The
extensive analysis of electromagnetic current, modulation and
amplification enabled Judge Gummow to conclude that "[w]hat is
important for present purposes is that the electromagnetic current
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 372.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 368-69.
44. Id. at 370-72.
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carrying music never passes to the premises of the subscriber, and
a person operating a telephone at the subscriber's premises will
never hear the music on hold. Instead, the current carrying the
music moves directly from the [Telstra] exchange to the caller."'4 5
The notion of a "subscriber" is crucial, as shall be seen below.
The primary right in question is the right "to cause the work
to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service" granted by
section 31(1)(a)(v) of the Copyright Act 1968.' However, any
interpretation of section 31(1)(a)(v) is partly dependent on how the
court reads section 26 of the Act, which amplifies the meaning of
"diffusion service."47  The court used section 26 to interpret
section 31, and analyzed the meaning of "service" in an effort to
identify "subscribers to the service.,4 8 Telstra was recognized as
"the person operating" the service within the meaning of section
26(4), and was, therefore, deemed to be the person who caused the
work to be transmitted under section 26(2).49
45. Id. at 371-72.
46. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 372.
47. Id. at 372-73. Section 26 states:
(1) A reference in this Act to the transmission of a work or other
subject-matter to subscribers to a diffusion service shall be read as a
reference to the transmission of the work or other subject-matter in the
course of a service of distributing broadcast or other matter (whether
provided by the person operating the service or by other persons) over
wires, or over other paths provided by.a material substance, to the
premises of subscribers to the service.
(2) For purposes of this Act, where a work or other subject-matter is so
transmitted:
(a) the person operating the service shall be deemed to be the
person causing the work or other subject-matter to be so transmitted; and
(b) no person other than the person operating the service shall be
deemed to be causing the work or other subject-matter to be so
transmitted, whether or not he provides any facilities for the trans-
mission.
(4) A reference in this section to a person operating a service of
distributing broadcast or other matter shall be read as a reference to the
person who, in the agreements with subscribers to the service, undertakes
to provide them with the service, whether he is the person who transmits
the broadcast or other matter or not.
(5) Where a service of distributing matter over wires or over other paths
provided by a material substance is only incidental to, or part of, a
service of transmitting telegraphic of telephonic communications, a
subscriber to the last-mentioned service shall be taken, for the purposes
of this section, to be a subscriber to the first-mentioned service.
Copyright Act 1968, § 26.
48. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 373.
49. Id. at 374.
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Judge Gummow held that the diffusion service was not
intended to be seen as part of the basic telephone service.5" His
reasoning was that "subscribers" to a diffusion service meant only
those telephone users (such as businesses) who actively subscribed
to a music on hold service or provided such a service themselves
for their callers.5 The callers themselves, in Judge Gummow's
opinion, were not subscribers within the meaning of section
31(1)(a)(v) of the Act.52 Because section 26(1) of the Act re-
quires that any diffusion service be routed to the premises of a
subscriber, and the music on hold was routed only to callers, the
court held that there was no transmission to subscribers of a
diffusion service, and therefore, no infringement.53
A second cause of action brought by APRA was that Telstra
performed the copyrighted works "in public" by transmitting music-
on-hold through wires or by wireless means to callers' tele-
phones.54 According to section 27(3) of the Act, "the causing
of... sounds to be heard ... shall be deemed to be effected by
the operation of the receiving apparatus."55 Therefore, it is not
the transmission of sound to an apparatus like a telephone that
causes the sound to be performed in public ("to be heard"), but it
is the operation of the receiving apparatus itself. Judge Gummow
interpreted this to mean that the person controlling the receiving
apparatus, in this case a telephone, was responsible for any public
performance under section 27(3), and therefore, Telstra's transmis-
sion did not constitute a public performance.56
The final cause of action brought by APRA was that Telstra
violated APRA's exclusive right to broadcast the music in question
under section 31(1)(a)(iv) of the Act when Telstra transmitted
music on hold to users of mobile telephones.5 7 While the fact that
Telstra transmitted music on hold was not disputed, this cause of
action also involved the question of whether a "public perfor-
mance" had taken place.5" Weighing many of the same factors
50. Id.
51. Id. at 375.
52. Id. at 376.
53. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 376.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting the Copyright Act 1968, §27(3)).
56. Id. at 377.
57. Id. Another section of the Act that is used to interpret section 31(1)(a)(iv)
is section 10(1) which defines "broadcast" to mean to transmit by wireless
telegraphy to the public. Id. at 378.
58. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 377-382. (discussing the Copyright Act
1968 (including the 1986 amendments), APRA v. Commonwealth Bank, 111
1998]
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already considered, Judge Gummow concluded that the private
nature of a mobile telephone transmission was antithetical to the
notion of a broadcast to the public, and that such a transmission by
Telstra was, therefore, not a violation of section 31(1)(a)(iv) of the
Act.5 9
Judge Gummow thus concluded that none of the acts done by
Telstra amounted to a statutory breach of APRA's copyright, and
that APRA was not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief.6"
The judge dismissed the suit and awarded costs to Telstra.61
2. The 1995 Appellate Court Decision.-APRA appealed the
decision to the appellate court, known as the full court. In a split
decision, the court allowed the appeal concerning both the
infringement of APRA's diffusion right and the right to broadcast
to the public over mobile telephones, but denied the appeal insofar
as it involved the infringement of APRA's right to re-transmit a
radio broadcast.62 In coming to the decision, the full court
analyzed the statutory provisions in much the same way that Judge
Gummow did at the trial level.63 The result, however, was quite
different.
Chief Judge Black, like Judge Gummow, looked to section 26
to define the right to transmit works to subscribers of a diffusion
service.' Judge Black's view was that the outcome of this portion
of the appeal hinged on section 26(5), which he interpreted to
mean that an incidental service (diffusion service) could be
considered a separate service! for purposes of section 26.65 Judge
Black stated that section 26(5) defined who the subscribers to the
incidental service are: "a subscriber to the telephone service is to
be taken, for the purposes of s26 ... to be a subscriber to the
distribution service., 66 He reasoned that since section 26(5) does
not require an actual subscription to the "incidental" service of
music on hold, there is no statutory impediment to categorizing a
A.L.R. 671, other Australian cases, and the United States Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
59. Id. at 382.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. Ltd. 131
A.L.R. 141 (1995).
63. Id. at 206.
64. Id. at 208.
65. Id. at 210. The incidental service to which Judge Black refers is the music
on hold service.
66. Id. at 211.
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telephone subscriber as a subscriber to the incidental service,
too.67 This conclusion, of course, is directly contrary to Judge
Gummow's holding at the trial level.
Judge Black also analyzed section 26(4), where an agreement
between subscribers and the provider of the diffusion service is
assumed by the statute.68 The appellate court's reasoning, howev-
er, may be incomplete regarding the relationship between service
provider and subscriber. Judge Black stated:
The subscriber to the telephone service is taken to be a
subscriber to the incidental service or services of distributing
matter [music on hold], the deemed subscription to the service
of distributing matter carries with it the implication that there
is an obligation to provide the service subscribed to, and that
obligation is taken to be imposed upon the person who in fact
agrees to provide the telegraph or telephone service of which
the other service is part, or only incidental.69
Under this rationale, the notion of a subscriber is nothing more
than a legal fiction. A subscriber to the basic telephone service,
according to Judge Black, has a right to the provision of the
subscribed service.7" In the Telstra situation, however, the
subscriber has no say whether music on hold is provided, and has
no recourse if the service is not provided. This lack of recourse
renders meaningless the right of the subscriber and moots the
implied obligation Judge Black would impose on the service
provider. A bona fide subscriber would have some recourse against
the service provider if the service failed.
Like Judge Black, Judge Burchett agreed that under section
26(5) the subscribers to basic telephone service should also be
considered subscribers to the service of providing music on hold.71
Judge Burchett stated:
[E]very subscriber whose telephone is used to make a call with
greater satisfaction . . . than would have been possible before
[Telstra] started to provide this service. The fact that these
customers have not separately and specifically sought this
particular service when they subscribed is irrelevant; the
67. APRA v. Telstra, 131 A.L.R. at 211.
68. Id. at 212.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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legislature must have contemplated that situation when it
enacted subss (3) and especially (5).72
Judge Burchett also analyzed the provision of music on hold
by means of playing a radio broadcast, concluding that under
section 199(4) of the Act, a person who plays a radio broadcast in
such a manner might be liable for infringement. 73 Telstra, in its
reply to APRA's initial allegations, argued that where one of its
customers played a radio to callers placed on hold, Telstra did not
receive the broadcast, and therefore could not have transmitted the
infringing material.74 In response to this logic, the judge pointed
to section 26(2), which he said made it "sufficient that the custom-
er's equipment effected 'a re-transmission' which was received by
[Telstra's] own equipment. ' 75
Judge Burchett went on to the final question of whether
transmission of music on hold to a mobile telephone constituted a
transmission "to the public" under section 31(1)(a)(iv) as defined
by section 10.76 He asked if this is "a transmission to the public,
notwithstanding that only one caller may in fact be listening.,
77
The judge further cited legislative history which affirmed "the
government's intention that 'broadcast,' in this context, should
cover transmissions to the copyright owner's public, whether the
'general' public or part of the public. ''78
In analyzing the facts of Telstra using the notion of the
"copyright owner's public," Judge Burchett relied on Ernest Turner
Electrical Instruments Ltd. v. Performing Right Society,7 9 a 1943
case which asked, "Is the audience one which the owner of the
72. APRA v. Telstra, 131 A.L.R. at 238.
73. Id. at 240-41. Section 199(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 states:
A person who, by the reception of an authorized television broad-
cast or sound broadcast, causes a literary, dramatic or musical work
or an adaptation of such a work ... to be transmitted to subscribers
to a diffusion service shall be treated, in any proceedings for
infringement of the copyright ... as if he had been the holder of a
license granted by the owner of that copyright to cause the
work ... to be transmitted by him to subscribers to that service by
the reception of the broadcast.
Id. at 240.
74. Id. at 241.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 242.
77. APRA v. Telstra, 131 A.L.R. at 242.
78. Id. Judge Burchett quoted the second reading speech of Australia's Attor-
ney General, made during the amendment process in 1986. Id.
79. 1 Ch 167, 175-76 (1943).
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copyright could fairly consider a part of his public?"8  Judge
Burchett concluded that "[p]erformance 'in public' means perfor-
mance to the public of the owner of the copyright, and 'public'
includes a portion of the public, however small."81 Thus, Judge
Burchett concluded that music on hold transmitted to a mobile
telephone is a transmission to the public, and therefore, is a
broadcast within the meaning of section 31(1)(a)(iv) of the Act.8 a
Judge Sheppard agreed with Judges Burchett and Black that
playing music on hold to a mobile telephone is a transmission to
the public and is an infringement of the broadcast right.83 On the
issue of diffusion rights, however, Judge Sheppard came to a
different conclusion than his colleagues. He analyzed section 26 of
the Act to find what constitutes an exclusive right (conferred by
section 31(1)(a)(v)) to cause a work to be transmitted to subscrib-
ers to a diffusion service.'
In Judge Sheppard's opinion, these two provisions of the Act
were not intended to address facts like Telstra's, but were intended
for situations such as pay-per-view, where subscribers are provided
with a facility for listening to music or watching video over material
paths coming to their premises.85 Judge Sheppard, like Judge
Gummow, read the statutory language for its plain meaning,
concluding that Telstra's operation of a telephone service was not
a diffusion service, and that telephone callers did not turn into
diffusion service subscribers simply by virtue of having listened to
music on hold.86
In agreeing with Judges Burchett and Black that the broadcast
right had been infringed, Judge Sheppard explained that he
believed that the nature of the use of the protected material, not
the privacy of the mobile phone call, was determinative of the
question.8' Thus, he concluded that the appeal should be allowed
for the broadcast right, but should be dismissed insofar as it
concerned the diffusion right.88 The decision of the full court was
to allow the appeal on the two grounds of infringement of the
80. APRA v. Telstra, 131 A.L.R. at 244 (quoting Ernest Turner Electrical
Instruments Ltd. v. Performing Right Society Ltd., (1943) 1 Ch 167 at 172-74).
81. Id. at 245.
82. Id. at 247.
83. Id. at 233-34.
84. Id. at 218.
85. APRA v. Telstra, 131 A.L.R. at 218.
86. Id. at 219.
87. Id. at 233.
88. Id. at 233-234.
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diffusion right and infringement of the right to broadcast to the
public, but to deny the appeal insofar as it involved infringement
by transmission of an authorized radio broadcast.89
III. The High Court's Decision in APRA v. Telstra
The High Court's decision comes into being from these two
test cases, where Judge Gummow, of the federal court, rejected all
of APRA's contentions of copyright infringement, and where
APRA's appeal to the full court resulted in a unanimous decision
that Telstra had broadcast the protected works to the public, and
a split decision holding that Telstra had caused the works to be
transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service.9" Telstra then
appealed the full court's decision to the High Court.
The High Court, per curiam, held that in each situation where
Telstra participated in providing music on hold to callers using
mobile telephones, Telstra operated a diffusion service which
broadcast the music "to the public" within the meaning of section
31(1)(a)(iv) of the Act.91 The Court reasoned that in a commer-
cial setting where people are willing to pay to have this service
provided to callers, the expectation is that the copyright owner is
entitled to reimbursement, even if not directly from the callers
themselves.92 The court, in a divided opinion, then held that when
Telstra participated in providing music on hold to' callers using
conventional telephones, it also operated a diffusion service and
transmitted music to subscribers to that diffusion service within the
meaning of section 31(1)(a)(v) of the Act.93
A. Provision of Music on Hold by Means of a Diffusion Service.
Of great importance in this holding is a statement contained in
the opinion of Justices Dawson and Gaudron, where the Justices
state:
89. Id. at 206-207. Black & Burchett, JJ allowed the appeal (Sheppard, J
dissenting) on the charge of playing music on hold from a recording. Black &
Burchett, JJ (Sheppard, J concurring) dismissed the appeal relating to music on
hold played from an authorized radio broadcast, and the court, per curiam,
allowed the appeal regarding mobile telephones.
90. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 5.
91. Id. at 2. Opinion by Dawson and Gaudron, JJ (Toohey and McHugh, JJ
concurring).
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. Opinion by Dawson, Gaudron & Kirby, JJ (Toohey & McHugh, JJ
contra).
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[U]nder 26(1), both in the case of broadcast matter and other
matter, the matter need not be provided by the operator of the
diffusion service. That is important because music on hold
comes from both sound recordings and radio broadcasts. In
either case it is irrelevant that Telstra has not itself provided or
selected the music [emphasis added].'
The Justices went on to say that the mere transmission of a
copyright-protected work from one telephone user to another (for
example, by whistling a tune), is not a "service," under section
26(1)."5 A service requires a system for the distribution of matter
where the distribution is a "spreading abroad or dispersal of the
thing being distributed. '9 6  As to whether Telstra provided a
diffusion service, the Justices then stated, "We are therefore
satisfied that the transmission of the works occurred in the course
of 'a service of distributing broadcast or other matter', namely, the
systematic provision of music on hold. It is this which constitutes
the diffusion service referred to in section 31(1)(a)(v)."'
The Court also stated that such a definition of a diffusion
service has certain consequences when it comes to determining who
the subscribers to the diffusion service are, as required by section
31(1)(a)(v)." A diffusion service as described above is not an apt
description of the telephone service provided by Telstra.99 The
Court differentiated the provision of basic telephone service from
the provision of the diffusion service, stating that the evident intent
of section 26(5) was to create subscribers to the diffusion service by
means of the incidental contact between the diffusion and tele-
phone services, even though such subscribers would not otherwise
exist.1"
Thus, the Court held that music on hold was transmitted to the
premises of subscribers, and it was transmitted to those premises by
Telstra, even without agreements for provision of that specific
94. Id. at 8. Justices Dawson and Gaudron go on to say that under section
26(1) there must still be a diffusion service, and that the aspect of that service
which is contested is the distribution of music on hold. Id.
95. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 9.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 10. The Court also points out that this
ruling expands the operation of section 26(1) and consequently, extends the
application of section 31(1)(a)(v), requiring the two sections to be read together.
Id.
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service.101 Therefore, in each situation where Telstra "participat-
ed in the provision of music on hold to callers using conventional
telephones," it operated a diffusion service and transmitted works
via that service to subscribers within the meaning of section
31(1)(a)(v) of the Act.102
Justice Toohey agreed with the reasoning behind the full
court's holding that Telstra operated a diffusion service." 3
However, he disagreed with the holding of the High Court majority
that telephone customers are automatically subscribers to the
diffusion service, finding the dissenting opinion of Judge Sheppard
of the full court persuasive instead.1" In explaining why he held
that callers are not subscribers to music on hold, Justice Toohey
quoted Judge Sheppard: "They are strangers to it. They do not
solicit it and they do not subscribe to it. Their purpose in tele-
phoning the number is to deal with the organisation, [Telstra] or
otherwise, with which they have business."10 5
Justice Toohey went on to analyze section 26(4), which he read
as emphasizing the agreements with subscribers to provide them
with the physical transmission of copyright material to the subscrib-
er's premises."° The Justice stated that Telstra's appeal on the
diffusion service issue should be allowed, and that Judge Gum-
mow's judgment should be restored. 7
Like Justice Toohey, Justice McHugh was of the opinion that
Telstra's appeal on the diffusion question should be allowed,
because no subscriber to a diffusion service had been properly
identified.0 8 In Justice McHugh's view, it is a statutory fiction to
deem a telephone subscriber to be a subscriber to a diffusion
service. This fiction should not be extended by implication to make
the provider of telephone services into one who by implied
agreement provides the subscriber with the service of distributing
copyrighted matter. 1°9 The views of these two Justices did not
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id.
105. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 18. (quoting Sheppard, J, in 131 ALR at
152).
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 35.
109. Id.
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prevail, however, and Telstra's appeal on the diffusion right issue
was denied."'
B. The Provision of Music on Hold to Cellular Telephones
The High Court came to greater agreement on the issue of
whether Telstra's transmission of music on hold to callers using
cellular telephones was "to the public" under section 31(1)(a)(iv)
of the Act."1 The Court, per curiam, held that in each instance
where Telstra played music on hold in this fashion, it had broadcast
the unauthorized works "to the public" and had infringed the
copyright of APRA."2 Both Justices Toohey and McHugh, who
dissented on the diffusion right question, were in agreement with
the remainder of the Court on this question."3
The High Court affirmed the full court's analysis of the
meaning of "to the public," stating that the distinction between
public and private is not the issue, but rather the issue is the nature
of the copyright owner's public and whether that public can include
callers who receive music on hold." 4 The High Court dismissed
the appeal on this issue, concluding that Telstra had broadcast to
the public when it transmitted music on hold to mobile telephone
callers, thereby infringing APRA's right to broadcast to the public
under section 31(1)(a)(iv)." 5
C. What is the Underlying Rationale of APRA v. Telstra?
The approaches of the two litigants regarding the music on
hold issue were explained in Justice Kirby's rather lengthy
opinion.
116
1. Telstra's Approach to the Copyright Liability Is-
sues.-Telstra argued that the full court erred when it found
Telstra, a general telecommunications carrier, liable for copyright
infringement when it transmitted music on hold."7 In Telstra's
opinion, the fact that it did not control the content of the music on
hold transmissions (often even in the case of its CustomNet service)
110. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 3.
111. Id. at 2-3. Opinion by Dawson and Gaudron, JJ (Toohey and McHugh,
JJ concurring).
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 16.
116. Id. at 49-50.
117. Id. at 49.
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was a crucial factor. 18 Telstra further argued that the Copyright
Act 1968 did not intend to make the provider of a general
telecommunications service strictly liable for the copyright
infringement of its customers when the provider had no knowledge
of the infringement and no opportunity to prevent its occur-
rence.
119
Telstra's second major argument was that the full court erred
in deeming telephone customers to be subscribers to the diffusion
service when, in reality, the customers who were placed on hold did
not seek out the particular music played, or even music on hold
generally, but sought only to communicate with another person for
personal or business reasons.12° In Telstra's opinion, the missing
element in the relationship between the subscriber and the service
provider was agreement between the two, an element which also
distinguished the present facts from the cases relied upon by the
full court in making its decision.121
2. APRA's Approach to the Copyright Infringement Is-
sue.-APRA based its case on the notion that the diffusion and
broadcast rights of the Copyright Act 1968 were part of a right of
"public communication" which had its origins in the Berne
Convention.122 APRA urged the Court to utilize the Berne
Convention, along with the legislative history of the Copyright Act
1968, as a guide to construing the statutory language.123  The
Court accepted APRA's suggested model, bypassing the narrow
construction favored by Telstra in favor of a broad reading of the
statutory language.
124
3. General Considerations Relating to the Majority Opinion.-
According to Justice Kirby, the statutory language was not
118. Id. Telstra's CustomNet service supplies business customers with a music
on hold service from a central location on Telstra premises. Id. at 37-38. When
the caller is placed on hold, the service plays music from Telstra's equipment, not
that of the customer. Id.
119. Id.
120. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 49-50.
121. Id. at 50.
122. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886,
Art. 11(1)(ii) and Art. 11bis (1). The term "Berne Convention" includes not only
the text of the initial convention in 1886, but also the several revisions over the
past century, including the revisions of 1896 (Paris), 1908 (Berlin), 1928, 1948
(Brussels), 1967 (Stockholm), and 1971 (Paris). The Berne Convention is available
in U.S. sources as P.L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
123. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 50.
124. Id. at 50-51.
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absolutely clear, thus, requiring the High Court to ascertain the
intent of Parliament as expressed in the Act.'25 Even if that
intent was ambiguous, said the Justice, policy considerations could
be utilized as an important means of achieving a resolution. 12 6
The Justice stated:
The law of copyright is concerned with balancing the public
interest in economic and cultural development against the
interests of individuals in securing a fair and equitable return
for their intellectual efforts. The potential liability of a
telecommunications carrier for infringement of copyright,
promoted through its network, is a matter of considerable
public importance. 27
Justice Kirby, who agreed with Judge Sheppard of the full court on
this point, noted that such considerations point to the need for a
legislative solution.'28 He stated that "in this area, where the
interests are large, and the rights are ultimately derived from the
language of an international treaty of national as well as global
importance, judicial restraint is called for where an Act is obscure
or arguably inapplicable., 129
However, the Justice pointed out that international treaties
notwithstanding, the facts of this case involve "the construction of
an Act of the Australian Parliament," and thus, will require the
court to find Parliament's purposes expressed in the statutory
language. 3 ' When more than one construction is available, he
stated, the Court should adopt that construction which best suits
the purposes of Parliament."'
Like the full court, Justice Kirby recognized that the construc-
tion of the term "subscriber" as defined in section 26(5) was
determinative of the appeal with respect to the diffusion right.132
Justice Kirby highlighted the problem when he inadvertently
referred to business customers, not callers, as "subscribers" to the
125. Id. at 51.
126. Id.
127. Id. Justice Kirby further noted that the financial costs of this decision to
telecommunications carriers (and thus, to the public, who will bear those costs),
is considerable, and will possibly increase with time as technologies become more
integrated and the boundaries blur between carriers and content providers. Id.
128. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 51.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 52.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 55.
1998]
208 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1
music on hold service.133 This is not the way the term was
construed by the full court' or by the rest of the High
Court.'35 On the other hand, this is the natural and logical way
to conceptualize the parties in this matter-that the "subscriber" is
the person who has entered into an agreement for the service sub-
scribed to. However, it was necessary for a different, somewhat
strained construction of "subscriber" to be made in order for
Telstra to be held liable, because by the plain meaning of the term,
Telstra did not transmit music to subscribers, but to the subscriber's
callers. The subscribers never heard the music, because it never
went to their premises.
136
This momentary lapse notwithstanding, Justice Kirby agreed
with the full court majority on the diffusion right issue. He
reasoned that the meaning of the Act required that section 26(5)
be viewed within the context of section 26 as a whole, and that
section 26(5) should define the term "subscriber" for the entire
section."' The Justice persuasively stated the international policy
reasons for his agreement:
The Act was enacted in terms which permitted Australia to
subscribe to the [Berne] Convention .... It is well established
doctrine in this country that, in cases of ambiguity, courts will
favour a construction of an Australian statute which accords
with the international obligations of Australia under a treaty
which it has ratified, over an interpretation which is inconsistent
with the obligation.'
138
133. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 55. Justice Kirby states:
The difficulty here is obvious. It is the caller, and not the subscriber to
the music on hold service, who receives the music. [emphasis added]. For
technical reasons, the music never reaches the premises of the person
who is providing the music on hold. By definition that person is busy,
occasioning the need to 'hold'.
Id. It is interesting that after both the full court and the High Court have
struggled to deal with the legal fiction of defining a "subscriber" under the
language of section 26(5), Justice Kirby should so engagingly bring the issue back
to reality with this plain language gaffe. At this point in his opinion, Justice Kirby
obviously conceives of callers and subscribers as different persons, notwithstanding
the definitional gymnastics performed by both appellate courts.
134. APRA v. Telstra, 131 A.L.R. at 212.
135. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 3. Agreeing with the full court's position
on the construction of section 26(5), the High Court held that a subscriber to the
telephone service was also a subscriber to the diffusion service. Id.
136. Id. at 55.
137. Id. at 57.
138. Id. at 58. Justice Kirby goes on at some length concerning the purposes
of the Berne Convention, and in particular, the 1948 Brussels revision, as well as
the history of the incorporation of the Copyright Act 1956 (UK) into Australian
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The Justice went on to state that section 26(5), which deemed
subscribers to telephone service also tobe subscribers to a diffusion
service, eliminated the need for an agreement between Telstra and
subscribers, because under section 26(5) the music on hold is
incidental to the telephone service.139 This rationale allowed the
provision of music on hold to fall within the scope of the protec-
tions of the Act.140
As Justice Kirby stated the problem: "If the 'subscribers to
the service' referred to in s26(4) of the Act were subscribers to the
service of music on hold, then no 'agreements' with such subscrib-
ers to provide such a service to them are identifiable. Music on
hold would fall outside the terms of the Act."14' He then went
on to state that the solution to this "problem" is simply to deem a
regular telephone subscriber also to be a music on hold subscriber,
which is a construction allowable under the language of the
Act.142 Ignoring the fact that the actual "subscribers" were
Telstra's business customers (the ones who actually had a written
agreement and paid the money to have the music service supplied
for their telephone number), the Court artfully re-defined the term
"subscriber."
Justice Kirby agreed with the comments of Judge Black of the
full court in construing section 26 and defining what constitutes a
"service. ' 143  Justice Kirby noted that: "the service, whether
provided directly by the trader itself or by a third party, is provided
for the benefit of the trader's customers. It is the perceived benefit
to the customers that makes the provision of the service of benefit
to the trader."'" This logic is necessary for the court to be able
to rationalize its holding that subscribers to one service are also
subscribers to a second, unsought service.
law in 1959. His point is that, because the UK law was enacted while taking into
account the 1948 Brussels revisions, and because Australian law (in particular
sections 31(1)(a)(v) and 26 of the Copyright Act 1968) was adopted from the
UK/Berne Convention model, the Court should favor APRA's argument that the
Act 1968 should receive broad construction. Id. at 58-62. "[I]n cases of ambiguity,
courts will favor a construction ... which accords with ... a treaty which
[Australia] has ratified." Id. at 58.
139. Id. at 63.
140. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 63.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 53-54.
144. Id.
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4. Was This Decision Designed to Prompt Parliament Into
Action?-In the final paragraph of his opinion, Justice Kirby
addressed the implications of the decision:
It has been suggested that the foregoing conclusions could have
significant consequences for other information technol-
ogies-including facsimile services, video conferencing and data
transmission. In particular, it has been argued that telecommu-
nications carriers and perhaps even internet service providers
could potentially become liable as a result of internet users'
downloading works which are protected by copyright. Clearly,
such issues go beyond the scope of this appeal. They were not
developed in the arguments of the parties. However, the
parliament may need to consider these questions-and others
arising-and to formulate a legislative response to them. They
cannot be solved, but have not been overlooked, by me.145
Telstra Corporation and other commentators believed that the
High Court decision, and the decisions leading up to it, would push
Parliament into considering revisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
In an August 14, 1997 press release, Telstra's headline stated,
"High Court decision underlines need for Copyright Act re-
form."'" The press release pointed out that the decision may
have an impact on copyright-protected transmissions beyond music
on hold, for example, over the Internet and by video conferenc-
ing.147 Telstra also approved of a recent initiative between the
Commonwealth Attorney-General and the Minister for Communi-
cations, which identified the need for reform of the copyright laws
in order that they should keep current with the rapid technological
changes, particularly in on-line communications. 4 8 Other com-
mentators predicted that the Australian government would move
ahead on changes to the Copyright Act 1968 in such areas as new
technology and the convergence of telecommunications, computing,
145. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 74.
146. Peter Hansen, High Court decision underlines need for Copyright Act
reform, (Telstra Corp. press release, August 14, 1997), <http://www.telstra.com-
.au/searcb./index.html>.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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and entertainment.4 9 This, of course, is exactly what has hap-
pened.
According to Daryl Williams, the government's Attorney-
General, the Copyright Act 1968 is to be amended, partly in order
to protect Internet service providers from liability in situations
where the provider does not originate the material. I5 ° The
government's proposed reforms were scheduled to be available by
the end of August, 1998,15 but as of this writing have not yet
been made public.'52 The reforms are anticipated to address the
concerns of copyright owners, users, and service providers, while
continuing to promote creativity and access to materials.'53 In
these respects, the Australian Parliament is in much the same
position as the United States Congress in its attempts to deal with
copyright issues in an information technology age.
IV. Analysis of the Trend in the United States
The United States grapples with the same issues of service
provider liability and out-of-date copyright laws that plague
Australia. Unlike Australia, however, no case involving these
issues has come before the Supreme Court of the United States.
Service and content providers realize that their respective industries
could be hamstrung unless some accommodation can be reached to
meet both the need for protection of intellectual property and the
need for relative freedom on the Internet.
149. Eliezer, supra note 3; see also Loughlan, supra note 10, at 342; and Peter
Leonard, Content Providers and the Copyright Trap-Synapses, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, June 6, 1995, at 37, available in LEXIS, TXTLNE Library, TXTANZ
File.
150. Steve Pennells, Copyright Aid Planned for Net Industry, THE WEST
AUSTRALIAN, June 13, 1998, at 40, available in LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS
File.
151. Business to Wait for Internet Copyright Reform, AAP NEWSFEED, June 11,
1998, available in LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS File.
152. As of October 15, 1998, the government's proposals were not available in
any of the online sources checked by the author.
153. Business to Wait for Internet Copyright Reform, supra note 151. Mr.
Williams expressed the hope that the reforms would "lead to greater certainty
about copyright rights and liability on the Internet in Australia" while protecting
content providers and allowing access by users. Id.
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A. The State of Copyright Law in the United States
Like Australia, the basic copyright protections offered in the
United States are constitutionally based. 54 The Copyright Act,
first passed in 1790, has been amended in an attempt to keep up
with new technology and concerns. 155  The current statute is
similar to Australia's in the categories of works that receive
protection, and in the overall protections afforded. However, the
Copyright Act does not address the issue of service provider
liability for third party infringement, relying instead on the common
law to provide for vicarious liability and contributory liability for
such infringement.
1 56
The Copyright Act is a strict liability law, and does not address
whether a service provider can be liable for acts of copyright
infringement by its customers. 57 Although there is no statutory
provision for a person's liability for the copyright infringement of
others, neither is such liability precluded by the statute.158 Both
contributory infringement and vicarious liability for copyright
infringement are possible under the common law, the standards for
which were set down by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.159 Although no service provider has
yet been found liable for direct infringement, bulletin board service
operators who were aware of the infringing material being posted
to their bulletin boards have been held directly liable.160 Appro-
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8, states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries;" see also supra text accompanying note 22 (stating that this part of the
Constitution was modeled on the Statute of Anne).
155. Burr, supra note 15, at 247.
156. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
157. William J. Cook, Be Wary of Internet Casting Shadows on Copyright
Holders, CHICAGO LAWYER, April 1996, at 60., available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS
database, 4/96 CHIL 60; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
158. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Services,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Generally, Netcom holds that
in order for liability to be imputed to a service provider, the service provider must
know or should have known of the infringing activity. Id. at 1373-74.
159. 464 U.S. 417. Liability for contributory infringement arises when a person
induces, causes, or materially contributes to another's infringing activity while
knowing or having reason to know of its infringing nature. Id. at 435. Vicarious
liability requires the right and ability to control the infringing activity and the
receipt of direct financial benefit from the infringement. RTC v. Netcom, 907 F.
Supp. at 1375-77.
160. Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.,
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priately, the outcomes of the cases have imposed liability only when
the parties were clearly involved in the infringing activity.
16
'
In recent years, a handful of U.S. copyright cases have touched
upon service provider liability, but none has the weight of prece-
dent outside its own jurisdiction. 62 Unlike APRA v. Testra, these
U.S. cases have dealt with the Internet rather than with telephone
service and music on hold. In all but one of these cases, the service
being provided was an Internet Bulletin Board Service (hereinafter
"BBS"), where users can sign on to "talk" or to upload or
download items of interest.
Bulletin boards are usually organized by topics of interest and
are frequently run without the benefit of editorial or other
control.163  Generally, anyone who wishes to may sign on to a
bulletin board ("USENET newsgroups") and can post ("upload")
or respond to messages or copy ("download") items of interest.'"
It is primarily in the uploading and downloading of messages or
other materials that copyright infringement occurs.
1. Background Cases.-In Sega v. MAPHIA,'65 users of a
bulletin board who uploaded or downloaded unauthorized copies
of protected Sega video games to a BBS were held to have directly
violated the owner's exclusive right to distribute the work."6 The
BBS operator, who allowed users to infringe, but who did not
(September 16, 1997) (testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights),
available in LEXIS, ENTERT Library, CURNWS File.
161. Id.
162. The primary cases dealing with service provider liability are: Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); RTC v. Netcom,
907 F. Supp. 1361; United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass 1994);
and Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
163. GATES, supra note 32, at 113-14.
164. Id.
165. 948 F. Supp. 923.
166. Id. at 932-33. At issue in Sega was whether a BBS operator could be held
liable for copyright infringement when the operator encouraged users to upload
and download copyrighted video games without permission of the games' manufac-
turer. Id. The court in Sega distinguished between the direct infringement of
MAPHIA's BBS users, who downloaded copies of Sega's video games, and the
contributory infringement of the BBS operator who knew of the infringing activity
and materially contributed to it, but who did not upload or download the games
himself. Id. at 933. The court relied on Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 76
F.3d 259,264 (9th Cir. 1996) ("providing the site and facilities for known infringing
activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability"), and RTC v. Netcom, 907
F. Supp. at 1382 (holding that contributory liability attaches if the defendant
knows of the infringing activity and induces, causes, or materially contributes to
it). Id.
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himself directly infringe the copyright, was nonetheless held liable
for contributory infringement because he knew of the infringing
activity, encouraged it, and contributed to its success.167
Other cases include United States v. LaMacchia,168 where the
defendant set up a BBS to enable his correspondents to upload
protected software and games, and allowed others with a password
to download the protected material.169 LaMacchia was accused
of conspiracy to defraud under the criminal wire fraud statute
which requires an intent to devise a scheme "to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses ..... ,0 The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts
held that the wire fraud statute did not apply, because LaMacchia
did not profit from his actions; therefore, his actions were not
criminal acts under the criminal copyright statute. 71 While the
court dismissed the case on these technical grounds, it gave a
parting shot when it stated, "Criminal as well as civil penalties
should probably attach to willful, multiple infringements of
copyrighted software even absent a commercial motive on the part
of the infringer .... But '[i]t is the legislature, not the Court
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.""72
In Playboy v. Frena,73 an operator of a BBS provided
subscribers with high quality copies of photographic images owned
by the plaintiff.174 In affidavits, the defendant, Frena, stated that
he had never uploaded any of Playboy's photographs, and that all
170 infringing images had been uploaded to his BBS by subscrib-
167. Sega v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 933.
168. 871 F. Supp. 535.
169. Id.
170. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994). The court analyzed section 1343, the wire
fraud statute (and section 1341, the mail fraud statute) as being bifurcated by the
federal courts into two offenses: 1) devising a scheme to defraud, and 2) devising
a scheme to obtain money. U.S. v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 540-41.
171. The criminal copyright act states, in part: "Any person who infringes a
copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain shall be punished .... 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
172. U.S. v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545 (quoting Dowling v. United States,
473 U.S. 207,214 (1985)). This so-called "La Macchia loophole" was closed by the
No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-216, 111 Stat. 2678, which was enacted
December 16, 1997, largely in response to the LaMacchia holding. The NET Act
amends various portions of Titles 17, 18, and 28 of the U.S. Code. Id.; see also
Bill Pietrucha, Congress Leaves a Full High Tech Plate for January, NEWSBYTES,
November 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, 90DAY File.
173. 839 F. Supp. 1552.
174. Id.
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ers.'75 He further said that upon being served with a summons
in this matter, he had removed the photographs from the BBS and
monitored the BBS to prevent additional infringing photographs
from being uploaded.176 Nonetheless, the court found that Frena
had infringed the owner's "exclusive right to sell, give away, rent
or lend any material embodiment of his work," including the right
to publicly display the work.177
The U.S. District Court pointed out that there need not be an
intent to infringe in order for infringement to be found, and that
even an innocent infringer may be held liable, but that the
infringer's innocence may be taken into account when fixing
damages.178 Frena, however, was not an innocent infringer on the
related charge of trademark infringement, because he utilized the
Playboy and Playmate trademarks in the file descriptions he
provided for his customers.7 9 In addition, he removed the
Playboy trademarks from the photographs supplied by his subscrib-
ers and replaced them with his own advertisement. 0
2. The Netcom Case.-Unfortunately for purposes of this
comparison, none of these cases parallels the facts of APRA v.
Telstra, where the telecommunications provider was liable for
copyright infringement whether or not the provider directly
infringed.18' Each of the above-mentioned United States cases
involved a BBS operator who knowingly participated in the
infringement while avoiding direct infringement. However, in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services,'82 the focus comes closer to the facts of Telstra, since
Netcom is a provider of services in a similar, although certainly not
identical position to Telstra Corporation.'83 Telstra, as has been
mentioned, provides the primary telecommunications service for
Australia, while Netcom provides access to the Internet for
individual computer users all over the United States."8
175. Id. at 1554.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1556 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.11[A], at 8-124.1 (1993)).
178. Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1562.
181. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 11.
182. 907 F. Supp. 1361.
183. Id.
184. Netcom is not the only large Internet access provider. Others include
America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy. RTC v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at
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Like other Internet access providers, Netcom utilizes the local
telephone connections provided and serviced by whichever
company maintains the telecommunications system in a given area.
In simple terms, this means that Netcom's customers are linked
together through the regular telephone system; Netcom doesn't
provide the telephone system, doesn't run the Internet, and no one
pays for the Internet itself.185 Netcom does pay for dedicated
telecommunications lines which link it to others in the system, and
then charges customers a fee to connect to the Netcom computers
and to obtain access to the Internet through its system.86
In RTC v. Netcom, Dennis Erlich, a disenchanted former
minister of the Church of Scientology, posted portions of the
church's copyright protected works to a Usenet newsgroup where
criticism of the church was displayed. 87 Erlich gained access to
the newsgroup site through his subscription to a BBS run by
Thomas Klemsrud, who in turn accessed the Internet through
Netcom On-Line Communications, Inc.188 The church, through
its Religious Technology Center (hereinafter "RTC"), failed in its
attempt to stop Erlich from posting "near verbatim ... substantial"
portions of the protected works, and subsequently contacted both
Klemsrud and Netcom, requesting that Erlich be kept off the
Internet.189 In response, Klemsrud requested proof of copyright
ownership from RTC, and after being denied such proof, he
refused to accede to RTC's demands. 9° Netcom also refused
RTC's demands.1 91 As a consequence, in its subsequent suit
against Erlich, RTC also named Klemsrud and Netcom in its claims
of copyright infringement. 92
There was no question that Erlich copied the protected works
when posting them to the BBS, and that the Netcom system
automatically made temporary copies for the purely mechanical
purpose of transmitting Erlich's posting to and from the Inter-
net.1 93 Netcom argued that since it took no affirmative action to
copy the protected works, only Erlich should be liable for any
1368.
185. Id. at 1365 n.2.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1365.
188. Id. at 1366.
189. RTC v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1368.
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direct infringement, not Netcom.194 The court stated that Net-
com's act of creating a system which allowed copies to automat-
ically be made was "not unlike that of the owner of a copying
machine who lets the public make copies with it. Although some
of the people using the machine may directly infringe copyrights,
courts analyze the machine owner's liability under the rubric of
contributory infringement, not direct infringement." '95  Netcom
compared its actions to those of a common carrier that "merely acts
as a passive conduit for information.' 96
The District Court for the Northern District of California
agreed that a mere passive retransmission of all posted messages is
akin to the situation of a telephone company that might unknow-
ingly carry infringing material by fax or from an audio recording on
an answering machine.9 7 The court held that if only the "wires
and conduits" were provided, such passive transmission of material
could be exempt from liability.'98 However, the court was not
convinced that Netcom was entirely passive, as Netcom did more
than provide mere "wires and conduits," and was not obligated to
carry all traffic that came its way.1 99
After analyzing Playboy and Sega, the court framed its rather
narrow holding around the reasoning that, because there was an
actual direct infringer, it did not make sense to adopt a rule which
created additional liability for direct infringement on the part of
parties who do nothing more than set up a means of access to the
Internet.2" In dicta, the court stated that it "does not find
workable a theory of infringement that would hold the entire
Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be de-
terred.,20 1 After extensive further analysis of contributory and
vicarious liability issues, the court held that Netcom was not liable
for either direct or vicarious infringement, but that a genuine issue
194. RTC v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
195. Id. at 1369; see also UNSW v. Moorhouse, 6 A.L.R. at 206 (author's
pagination) (giving the similar Australian view on this issue).
196. RTC v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12.
197. Id. Note the similarity to the Telstra case, although Telstra Corp. was not
always a mere passive carrier.
198. Id.
199. Id. The court raises an interesting question here, with particular implica-
tions if the question is asked also in Australia. For example, if Telstra, as a
common carrier, is required by the terms of its license to carry all telephone traffic
that comes its way, can it logically be held liable if some of that traffic happens to
infringe someone's copyright?
200. Id. at 1372.
201. R.T.C. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
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of material fact was raised as to whether Netcom knew or should
have known that Erlich was infringing RTC's copyright.0 2
After the district court denied Netcom's motion for summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial on the question of
contributory liability, RTC and Netcom settled the suit out of
court.20 3 This, of course, left open the question of whether an
Internet service provider could be held liable for contributory
liability for copyright infringement if the provider knew or should
have known of the directly infringing activity of one of its subscrib-
ers.
B. The Debate in the United States Congress
For an Internet or telecommunications service provider with
millions of customers, the mere conduct of the core business could
theoretically result in the imposition of contributory or vicarious
liability on the company for infringing activity by any or all of its
customers. This scenario, while seemingly far-fetched, is possible
under current U.S. law, and it has now actually happened in
Australia. 2' This potentially unlimited liability for infringement
by others is the engine that has been driving one side of the debate
in the United States Congress over service provider liability and
revision of copyright legislation.0 5 The impact of such liability on
an industry which now reaches nearly one in every four people in
202. Id. at 1381. This alleged knowledge resulted from Netcom's receipt of
demand from RTC requesting that Erlich be barred from the system, id. at 1366,
an allegation that implicated whether Netcom participated in the infringement and
was thus entitled to a fair use defense. Id. at 1381.
203. Keith Stephens & John P. Sumner, Catch 22: Internet Service Providers'
Liability for Copyright Infringement Over the Internet, COMPUTER. LAW., May
1997, at 1, 3.
204. Telstra v. APRA, 146 A.L.R. at 75
205. See Peters testimony, supra note 160. After much debate and disagree-
ment during consideration of the administration's National Information Infra-
structure Implementation Bill in 1996, the Patent and Trademark Office was
requested to attempt a resolution to the online service provider liability issue, but
postponed the effort when Congress adjourned. Id. The 1997 debate, and Rep.
Coble's introduction of H.R. 2180 grew out of the prior year's actions. Hearings
on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of
Bruce A. Lehman, Asst. Secy. of Commerce and Comm'r of Patents and
Trademarks), available in LEXIS, ENTERT Library, CURNWS File. Much of the
impetus to achieve a resolution to this problem has come from Rep. Bob
Goodlatte (R-Va.), who convened a committee to devise a solution, but whose
efforts ultimately failed due to disagreement among the committee members. Id;
see also Copyright Liability Negotiations Continue, INTERNET WK., Mar. 11, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 7055533.
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the United States and Canada, and which doubled in size in the
past eighteen months, is potentially enormous.' °6
On the other side of the debate is the copyright owner,
perhaps a songwriter, whose latest hit can be both very popular and
far less profitable if just one customer uploads the recording to a
bulletin board and makes the work available at no cost to millions
of Internet users. This scenario is real. It is occurring now, and it
poses a real threat to intellectual productivity and creativity."' 7
The situation, viewed on a national scale, becomes an economic
problem with an impact that cannot be ignored. United States
copyright industries are roughly equivalent in workforce to the
automobile industry; are growing at twice the rate of the U.S.
economy; represent over $250 billion of Gross Domestic Product;
and generate $50 billion in foreign sales and exports, which are
exceeded only by the automobile and agricultural sectors of our
economy.208 International piracy of copyrighted works costs these
industries $18-20 billion annually.29
1. The WIPO and Online Service Provider Liability-The
United States, having joined the Berne Convention for the
206. Hearing on The Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet
Service Providers Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Comm.), available in 1997
WL 14150393; see also William J. Cook, supra note 157 (stating that in 1995, the
big three service providers, AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy had combined
revenues of more than $1 billion).
207. For example, unauthorized recordings of songs by Mariah Carey, the
Rolling Stones, the Police, and Sheryl Crow were available on the Internet to be
downloaded. One pirate music site, "Jon's Take But Don't Tell Page," received
over 36,000 "hits" in a three-month period. Copyright on the Internet-Promise
& Perils: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and 2281 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Cary H. Sherman, Sr. Exec. V.P. &
Gen. Counsel, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.), available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, CNGTST File.
208. The statistics are combined from: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Allee Willis, Songwriter, on behalf
of Broadcast Music, Inc.), available in 1997 WL 14150780; and Hearings on WIPO
Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and the Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Jack Valenti, Pres. and
CEO, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.), available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library,
CNGTST File.
209. Hatch statement, supra note 206. Senator Hatch's estimate of the
copyright industry's contribution to gross domestic product is $400 billion,
considerably higher than the figure offered by Jack Valenti, supra note 208.
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Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989,21' became a
major player in the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") treaty talks in Geneva during 1996.211 The WIPO
negotiations were designed to update the Berne Convention, with
particular attention paid to protecting performers and producers of
sound recordings.
12
One of the hoped-for results of the WIPO negotiations was to
bring the world into rough parity in terms of intellectual property
laws and enforcement.21 3 If adopted, the treaties could mean that
the United States copyright industry would have greater leverage
than ever before in effectively protecting its products in the global
marketplace.2 14 However, in order for American industries to
enjoy these benefits, the Geneva treaties must be ratified by a large
number of countries, including the United States.215 Commenta-
tors have urged Congress to pass the WIPO implementation
legislation expeditiously so that the United States may be seen to
be seriously supportive of the treaty provisions, but this passage did
not happen during the first session of the 105th Congress.
216
One reason for the failure to pass the legislation during the
first session was that the bill was used in the House of Representa-
tives during the first session as leverage in the debate over service
210. See Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (adopting the Berne
Convention).
211. Meeka Jun & Stephen D. Rosenboro, The WIPO Treaties: The Interna-
tional Battle Over Copyright Cyberturf, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 1997, at 8. The
World Intellectual Property Organization is composed of 160 member nations, and
was formed by the United Nations in 1989 to oversee the Berne Convention,
which is the principal international treaty concerning copyright protection. Id.
212. Lehman statement, supra note 205.
213. Hearings on H.R. 2180 and 2281, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Hilary B. Rosen, Pres. and CEO, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.),
available in LEXIS, ENTERT Library, CURNWS File. Rosen points out that
while the treaty provisions do not mandate an American level of protection in
other nations, they do enable the United States and other intellectual property
producing nations to enforce rights more effectively in a digital environment. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see also Ellen Messmer, Congress to Debate 'Net Copyright Legislation,
NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, ENTERT Library,
CURNWS File (stating that a minimum of 30 nations must ratify the WIPO
treaties for them to take effect).
216. See Rosen statement, supra note 213; see also Lehman statement, supra,
note 205 (outlining the ratification process, which includes advice and consent by
the Senate, which received the Treaties from President Clinton on July 28, 1997).
The House and the Senate failed to pass the initial implementing legislation (H.R.
2281, introduced by Rep. Coble, and S. 1121, introduced by Sen. Hatch) during the
first session of the 105th Congress. See Pietrucha, supra note 172.
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provider liability. Online service providers believed that the vague
wording of the WIPO treaties left the providers open to liability for
failure to monitor Internet transmissions for copyright violations,
and asked Congress to add an exemption from liability to the
implementing legislation.217 Senator John Ashcroft (R., Mo.)
proposed legislation (S. 1146) that addressed both the service
provider concerns and the WIPO implementing legislation.218
The Ashcroft bill clarified liability for those who merely pass
information through the Internet without controlling content, and
provided for rapid removal of infringing material upon notice from
the copyright owner.219
217. Hatch Seeks Agreement on Online Copyright Liability, TELECOMM. REP.
INT'L, Sept. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10454345.
218. Id. The bill was entitled the Digital Copyright Clarification and Technolo-
gy Education Act of 1997. See also Bill Pietrucha, Ashcroft Seeks Copyright
Upgrade for Internet, NEWSBYTES, Sept. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File. A number of the groups testifying during the Senate and
House hearings in September of 1997 expressed support for the Ashcroft bill,
among them the Computer and Communications Industry Association (see Black
testimony infra note 237), the US Telephone Association (see Neel testimony, infra
note 233), the Digital Future Coalition, and the American Committee for Inter-
operable Systems (see Pietrucha article, supra this note). Content providers, in
general, do not seem to support any revision of copyright laws that exempts
service providers from liability.
219. Pietrucha, supra note 218; see also S.1146 text, which would add section
512 to Title 17 U.S.C, stating in part:
Sec. 512. Liability relating to material on the Internet and on-line
(a) Material Being Transmitted Through an Electronic
Communications System or Network
(1) Network Services With Respect to the Transmission of Electronic
Communications
-A person shall not be liable for direct, vicarious or contributory
infringement of copyright arising out of providing electronic communi-
cations network services or facilities with respect to a copyright
infringement by a user. A person shall be considered to provide 'network
services and facilities' when such person transmits, routes or provides
connections for material on behalf of a user over an electronic communi-
cations system or network controlled or-operated by or for the person,
including intermediate and transient storage, the processing of informa-
tion, and the provision of facilities therefor, if-
(A) the provision of services is for the purpose of managing,
controlling or operating a communications system or network, supplying
local access, local exchange, telephone toll, trunk line, private line, or
backbone services, including network components or functions necessary
to the transmission of material contained in electronic communications
carried over those services; or
(B) the transmission of material over the system or network on
behalf of a user does not involve the generation or material alteration of
content by the person.
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Representative Howard Coble (R., N.C.) introduced H.R.
2180, the On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act, on July 17,
1997, in an attempt to address the concerns of the service provider
industry.22° H.R. 2180, however, met with sharp resistance from
the content provider community, which felt that its passage would
not only exempt Internet service providers from liability for
infringement, but would emasculate the content providers' ability
to seek and achieve redress for electronic copyright infringe-
ment.221
Service providers, however, generally favored the provisions
contained in H.R. 2180, and put pressure on the House to pass the
measure if Congress wanted their support for the passage of H.R.
2281, the WIPO Copyright Treaties Act.222  Rep. Coble, who
chairs the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property, and who introduced H.R. 2281 as well as
H.R. 2180, held hearings on both bills simultaneously, permitting
content and service providers to address both the liability issue and
WIPO implementation at the same time.223 The resulting turmoil
from two powerful factions wrestling over proposed legislation
effectively killed the implementing legislation for that session.224
2. Content Providers Argue to Preserve the Status Quo.-In
the House hearings, representatives of the content provider
Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146,
105th Cong. § 102(a).
220. H.R. 2180 would have exempted a party from direct or vicarious liability
for transmitting or providing access to material online, and from monetary
damages under contributory infringement if six criteria are met. Those criteria are
that the person seeking the exemption: 1) does not initially place the material on-
line; 2) does not generate, select, or alter the content; 3) does not determine who
the recipients are; 4) does not receive financial benefit from the infringement; 5)
does not sponsor, endorse, or advertise the material; and 6) has no knowledge or
awareness that the material is infringing. On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation
Act of 1997, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. § 2.
221. House Panel to Start 2 Days of Copyright Hearings, COMM. DAILY, Sept.
16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13778980.
222. Bill Holland, U.S. WIPO Bill Is Entwined With Online Liability Issue,
BILLBOARD, September 27, 1997, at 8.
223. House Panel to Start 2 Days of Copyright Hearings, supra note 221.
224. Adding to the confusion, a number of the news reports on the House
hearings misquoted (reversed) the numbers of the two bills in question, and
misrepresented the parties in support or in opposition to either of the bills. See,
eg. Holland, supra note 222, and Equipment Manufacturers, Others Restate
Opposition to WIPO Measure, TELECOMM. REP. INT'L, Sept. 26, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 10454358; see also Hilary Rosen statement, supra note 213 (stating
that failure to implement the WIPO treaties would place "at risk some of
America's most dynamic, visible, and productive industries and workers").
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industries225 voiced their opposition to H.R. 2180, and asked why
service providers should be granted exemption from liability for
infringement when the few suits that have been brought have not
subjected service providers to debilitating damage awards in
court.226 Generally, the content providers spoke with one voice
in saying "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."
227
Content providers also said they needed the help of online
service providers to stop what they consider to be rampant piracy
and infringement in the online environment.22 They argued that
the service providers would not exist if it were not for the financial
benefits that accrue from being able to provide content that people
want to access, and that service providers have a responsibility to
help protect that content.229 The view of content providers was
that current law, with its mixture of direct, vicarious, and contribu-
tory liability, and the possibility of both equitable and monetary
relief, gives adequate protection to the content industries without
unduly burdening the service providers. 2 0  Thus, the content
providers wished to keep the status quo with regard to the law, and
to pass the WIPO implementing legislation, which they saw as
further protecting their interests abroad. They also wished to
separate H.R. 2180 from the consideration of WIPO, because H.R.
2180 made changes in the Copyright Act that content providers felt
were harmful to their interests. 231
3. Service Providers Argue for Change.-On the other hand,
online service providers and others involved in providing communi-
cations services and networks strongly supported H.R. 2180, a bill
that they felt gave them some protection from strict liability for
225. Organizations speaking for the content providers included the Motion
Picture Association of America, the Software Publishers Assn., the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, Broadcast Music, Inc., and the
Recording Industry Association of America, among others.
226. See Valenti testimony, supra note 208.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Hearings on H.R. 2180 "On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act," and
H. R. 2281, the "WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act," Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of John Bettis, Songwriter, on behalf of
the Amer. Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers), available in 1997 WL
14150781.
230. Id.
231. See Rosen statement, supra note 213.
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actions not of their doing and not under their control.2 2 It is
interesting that the House Subcommittee Hearings took place on
September 16 and 17, 1997, just two days after the Australian High
Court held a telecommunications provider liable for copyright
infringement in the Telstra case. No mention of the Australian case
was made during the hearings, presumably because the participants
were unaware of it.
Roy Neel, President of the United States Telephone Associa-
tion, represented the view of some service providers that the
lawsuits that have been brought against their industry for infringe-
ment are simply the tip of a looming iceberg. He quoted a
statement by Recording Industry Association of America Vice
President, Frank Creighton: "The fight about third party liability
will be resolved in future litigation., 233  The service providers,
realizing that theirs are the "deep pockets" being targeted, are
concerned about the potential for liability for acts of infringement
of which they are unaware and which they are unable to moni-
tor.
234
Neel argued:
Even if ISPs could investigate every corner of the expanding
online universe, ISPs would have no way of knowing whether
the material they encounter is authorized by the current
copyright owner or not .... The point is that only the content
owner or his agent can ever know for sure what is an autho-
rized use.235
The suggestion by Neel and others was for service and content
providers to work together to combat piracy on the Internet, using
a system where copyright owners would be responsible for
identifying infringing uses of their material and for notifying the
service provider of the illegal use.236 The service provider, upon
232. Organizations representing the service provider industry included the
United States Telephone Association, Prodigy, Inc., the Information Industry
Association, the Digital Future Coalition, the Ad-Hoc Copyright Coalition, and
the Computer and Communications Industry Association.
233. Hearings on H.R. 2180, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of
Roy Neel, President and CEO, U.S. Telephone Assn.), available in LEXIS,
ENTERT Library, CURNWS File.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Neel testimony, supra note 233.
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such notice, would then take appropriate action to remove the
site.237 Essentially, this was the core of the liability portion of
Sen. Ashcroft's bill, which also would have implemented the WIPO
treaties.
238
4. Legislative Solutions: The Digital Millenium Copyright Act
-Although the bills have been partially renumbered and renamed,
the House and Senate have taken the first session's legislation and
reworked the bills. The WIPO Implementation Act (H.B. 2281)
passed the House in April 1998 and was sent to the Senate.239
The Senate amended the bill striking out all text after the enabling
clause and inserting the text of S. 2037.2 0 This modified bill was
passed by the Senate and returned to the House for approval, but
the House refused to concur with the Senate amendments.
241
The modified bill, now titled the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, was sent to a Conference Committee in an attempt to find a
solution palatable to both the House and the Senate.242 On
October 8, 1998, the House passed the Conference Report, and the
Senate did likewise on October 9, 1998.243 The Digital Millenni-
um Copyright Act was signed into law by President Clinton on
October 28, 1998.24
The bill addresses the issues of fair use regarding institutional
copying,245 clarifies the rules regarding technological protection
measures,246 ensures that privacy issues will be addressed on the
247Internet, and addresses a number of other issues not relevant
to this comment. Most importantly, the bill implements the WIPO
treaties and attempts to clarify the liability of on-line service
providers. 248
237. See id.; see also Hearings on H.R .2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Edward J. Black, President, on behalf
of the Computer and Comm. Indus. Assn.), available in 1997 WL 14150842.
238. Pietrucha, supra note 218.
239. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997).
240. S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998).
241. H.R. 2281, supra note 239.
242. Id.
243. 144 CONG. REC. S11887-01 at S11889 (1998); and 144 CONG. REC. H10572-
17 at H10621 (1998); see also United States Bill Tracking, 1997 US H.B. 2281
(SN), available in Westlaw US-BILLTRK Database.
244. See United States Bill Tracking, supra note 243.
245. 144 CONG. REC. at S11887.
246. Id. at S11887-11888.
247. Id. at S11888.
248. Id. at S11889.
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As regards service provider liability, Title II, section 202 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act would eliminate liability for
simply providing the network over which the offending transmis-
sions were made, or for mechanically making the copies necessary
to transmit material over that network.249 Procedures are speci-
fied for notification of claimed infringement,250 although such
notification does not generally impute knowledge of infringing
activity to the service provider 5 1 Service providers must have
knowledge of the infringing activity to be held directly liable.252
In general, the provisions of the Act seem to favor the service
provider industry over the content providers, inasmuch as the bill
eliminates monetary damages against qualifying service provid-
ers253 and only allows injunctive relief in the form of restricting
the offender's access to the system, whether the offender is an
individual or a foreign online site. 4  If the service provider
expeditiously removes offending material, there is no liability.
2 5
Further, there are no provisions requiring service providers to
monitor or otherwise control content on their networks, a notion
which was hotly contested by both sides in testimony before the
House and Senate judiciary committees in 1997.256
The immediate problem is whether these amendments to the
copyright laws will suffice to bring those laws into the information
age. Keeping in mind that the law of copyright originated in
response to technology, and that subsequent revisions to copyright
laws have largely been driven by changes in technology, it is only
natural to revise these laws when faced with technological changes
of the magnitude that have marked the last quarter of this century.
However, if we accept the proposition that the copyright law has
been outdated in its application to current technologies, we are
then faced with the problem that these technologies are changing
at a rate inconceivable even a few years ago.257 Will these 1998
revisions to the copyright law still have any relevance in 2008?
249. 144 CONG. REC. H10048-01, H10053.
250. Id. at H10054.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at H10053.
254. 144 CONG. REC. at H10055.
255. Id. at 10054.
256. See generally supra notes 217-238 and accompanying text.
257. Gates, supra note 32 at 36-37.
SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY
V. Conclusion
The Australian High Court brought the service provider
liability issue in that nation to the front burner. By holding the
nation's largest telecommunications carrier liable for both direct
and contributory copyright infringement, the Court placed the
liability issue squarely in the lap of Parliament as a public policy
issue. The Australian Parliament could not let the decision stand,
for to impute liability to the nation's major telecommunications
provider for any act of infringement utilizing its network could
bring communications to an impasse. A close look at the High
Court decision to see just how far the court was able to stretch the
statutory language of the Copyright Act 1968 will probably be
helpful to Parliament in drafting revisions to the law.
How Parliament decides to deal with the revisions could well
have a major impact on Australia's role as a player in the develop-
ing global intellectual property marketplace. Australia, like the
United States, is a member of the Berne Convention.1 8 In the
negotiations among WIPO participants in Geneva, Switzerland, in
December of 1996, it was unanimously agreed that service
providers would not be held liable for copyright infringement solely
on the basis of providing the facilities used by others to in-
fringe. 9  Yet, such liability is precisely what the High Court
imposed upon Telstra Corp. when it stated that it was irrelevant
whether Telstra provided or selected the music on hold.26° One
of the scenarios where Telstra was found liable was where a third
party played unlicensed music on hold to its callers without
Telstra's participation, but over the communications system
provided by Telstra.261
Further, in this age of global communications, all nations, the
United States and Australia included, must examine and re-
examine the effect of their laws on transnational infringement. For
example, when a caller from Adelaide dials a number in Pennsylva-
nia and is put on hold to the sound of unlicensed music, is Telstra
liable for the infringing activity? In the northern hemisphere, is
Bell Atlantic liable? The answers are not clear, but the implica-
258. See note 138 supra, and accompanying text.
259. Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997)
(testimony of Robert L. Oakley, Georgetown Univ. Law Center).
260. Telstra v. APRA, 148 A.L.R. at 8.
261. APRA v. Telstra, 118 A.L.R. at 370.
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tions for both communications carriers become somewhat problem-
atic, because the same scenario could occur by e-mail, fax, or
teleconferencing with virtually the same result.
The Telstra decision exemplifies the service provider industry's
nightmare scenario, although the industry in the United States has
not yet recognized the implications of this particular case.262 In
the modern global environment, the decisions of another nation's
judicial or legislative bodies in determining the direction of policy
toward intellectual property rights cannot be ignored with impunity
by industries in this country. Because 70% of the world's Internet
traffic starts and stops in the United States, any decision that bears
on liability for infringement of copyright should be required
reading for both service and content providers.263
In the copyright arena, however, there is a significant disparity
between national laws and their enforcement-a disparity which
has resulted in a number of nations becoming pirate dens.2" In
order to level the playing field, national laws must be brought into
parity and enforcement must become a priority. The WIPO
Treaties have the potential to bring some degree of uniformity into
the international arena. While protecting the interests of the
intellectual property producing nations, the WIPO treaties will also
help boost the fledgling intellectual property industries in nations
such as Russia, China, and Italy, where piracy, not creativity, is
currently the norm.265
The opportunity exists, in Australia and the United States, to
bring the copyright statutes into the electronic age while setting an
example that the rest of the world will want to emulate. In both
nations, the legislatures are updating the copyright statutes, but.
whether these updates will be effective can only be measured after
implementation. Will these revisions be enough to lead the way
into an equitable, digital Twenty-First Century? Time will tell, but
the time and the technology will change quickly.
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